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I
INTRODUCTION

How important is experience in learning to become an effective police
officer? Police officers say vehemently that there is no substitute. The
training given in police academies is universally regarded as irrelevant to
"real" police work. Policing, it is argued, cannot be learned scientifically, in
the sense that if A is done in Y situation and B is done in X situation, then Z
will result. The life police officers confront is too diverse and complicated to
be reduced to simple principles. As police officers continually say, every situation is different. What is needed, then, is not learning in the book sense but
skills derived from handling a multitude of what seem like unique situations
over and over again.
If this view of policing is correct, then it follows that the best officers are
likely to be the most experienced, those who are older and have been in service longer. By extension, the only people fit to judge police activity in
encounters with the public are other experienced officers. Certainly civilians
could not make fair judgments, but neither could supervisors who had not
experienced the peculiarities of a specific situation. In effect, the mysteries of
the occupation are so profound that one not immersed repeatedly in police
operations could not possibly understand the constraints as well as the possibilities of particular circumstances. Few officers would state the case as
baldly as this, but these implications are fairly plain.
That this view of policing is self-serving is obvious. More troubling, however, is that it suggests that policing is not amenable to rational analysis and,
by extension, to formal learning. Contrary to the pretensions of police "professionalism," officers commonly portray policing as being essentially a craft
in which learning comes exclusively through experience intuitively processed
by individual officers. Admittedly, policing is not yet a science in the sense
that a body of principles has been generated that officers may follow with a
reasonable probability of achieving successful outcomes. Officers correctly
perceive that there is a gap between the operational world and the classroom,
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between the lore of policing as it is practiced and principles of human
behavior discovered by social scientists. It should not be forgotten that
people who teach, such as the many academic observers of policing, have as
large a vested interest in portraying policing as amenable to science and classroom learning as police officers do in rejecting it.
The purpose of this article is to show that the antinomy between policing
as a craft and policing as a science is false. What police say about how
policing is learned is not incompatible with attempts to make instruction in
the skills of policing more self-critical and systematic. Progress in police
training will come by focusing on the particularities of police work as it is
experienced by serving officers and by analyzing that experience and making
it available to future police officers. In order to achieve this, this article examines the work that patrol officers do, recognizing that while skills are required
to carry out more specialized police duties such as criminal investigation,
patrol work is the centerpiece of policing, occupying the majority of all police
personnel, accounting for most of the contacts with the public, and generally
initiating the mobilization of police resources.
II
THE NEED FOR LEARNING

If patrolmen acted like automata most of the time, then there would be
little scope for learning. This, of course, is far from the case. A vast amount
of research has shown that patrol work is fraught with decision: patrol officers
exercise choice constantly.' It should be noted in passing, however, that the
importance of choice in patrol work is a variable, especially when viewed on a
worldwide basis. In the United States, Britain, and Canada, responsibility for
tactical decisionmaking is delegated to the lowest ranks. But in many countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, regulations expressly prohibit lowerranking officers from making particular decisions. In such systems, patrolmen
and constables are hardly more than spear-carriers in the police drama,
mechanically patrolling according to fixed schedules and calling superior
officers to handle almost any interaction with the public beyond detaining suspects in crimes personally witnessed. 2 Even in countries where legal authorization is not truncated, organizational practice may require higher-ranking
officers to be summoned in specific circumstances.
In addition to command direction, the scope for learning in patrol work
varies with the nature of situations encountered. Situations can be ranked
along a continuum from the cut-and-dried to the problematic. For example,
1. See generally D. BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE (1980); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); W. LAFAVE, ARREST (1965); P. MANNING, POLICE WORK (1977); W. MUIR,
POLICE-STREET CORNER POLITICIANS (1977); A. REISS, POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971); J. RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE (1973); B. SMITH, POLICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1940);J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR

2.

(1968).

D. BAYLEY, THE POLICE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA (1969); D. Bayley, Patterns of

Policing (forthcoming).
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American officers have few doubts about what to do when a man is found
drunk lying on the ground in the winter. He must be picked up and taken to a
shelter. The choices are also fairly limited in serious traffic accidents, alleged
housebreaking, and assault with a deadly weapon witnessed by an officer.
This is not to argue that some choices are not involved in such cases-officers
can turn a blind eye or overreact-but rather that the appropriate responses
are clearly recognized by everyone involved-patrolman, public, and command officers. The appropriate action may not be easy to take, but it is
obvious. A robbery in progress is dangerous, but the patrolman's appropriate
response is straightforward. Investigating a young person on a street late at
night after curfew is rarely dangerous, but the decision as to what corrective
action should be taken is often perplexing.
American patrol officers recognize these variable features of the work they
do and can talk about them with discernment. They have an acute sense of
where danger lies and what kinds of situations cause them the greatest difficulty in deciding what to do. In fact, they are so accustomed to thinking about
the place of discretion in policing that a favorite in-house joke is that their
most problematic situation during each shift is deciding where to go for
lunch. In our experience, patrol officers single out disturbances as the most
problematic calls they receive, especially domestic disputes, meaning quarrels
among people who are living in the same household. These include wife beatings, child abuse, fights between gay roommates, disputes over property by
people living in a common-law relationship, violations of restraining orders,
and unruly children. The nextmost problematic activities that police officers
mention are proactive traffic stops, in which they choose to stop a moving
vehicle for some reason, and maintaining order among teenagers congregating in public places. Observers of police work have also chosen these situations when illustrating the complexity of police work. 3 Survey data supports
these impressionistic conclusions. Domestic disputes were by far the situation
most commonly cited in 1966-67 by Denver police officers as requiring street
decisionmaking, followed somewhat distantly by traffic violations. 4 In 1981,
police officers in Battle Creek, Michigan also mentioned domestic disputes
most frequently as their most problematic encounter. 5 Traffic violations were
largely ignored. It seems likely that perceptions of the problematic nature of
situations are related to the frequency of their occurrence in the working life
of police officers. That is, if a particular kind of situation is rarely encountered, officers may not be sensitized to its complexity. Proactive traffic stops,
for example, allow considerable scope for choice, but officers may not know
this unless departmental policy encourages such activity.
3. See D. BLACK, supra note 1, at 188-89; W. MUIR, supra note 1, ch. 6; J. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 1,
at 153.
4.

D. BAYLEY & H.

MENDELSOHN,

MINORITIES AND THE POLICE 72 (1969).

The authors cite

figures of 38% and 14%, respectively.
5.

Domestic disputes were mentioned by 29.3% of the officers surveyed. D. Bayley, Police and

Community Attitudes in Battle Creek, Michigan: An Interim Report on the Evaluation of the Police
Improvement Project (September, 1981) (unpublished report by the Police Foundation).
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Although some, work that patrolmen do is clearly discretionary, it is
uncertain precisely how much of it is. If situations calling for the use of discretion occur frequently, then the ability to make decisions becomes central to
patrol work. On the other hand, if they occur infrequently, then the kinds of
skills that experience teaches are less helpful. The uncomfortable fact is that
despite the enormous attention given to studying patrol work, especially to
charting the nature of calls for service, little is known about the degree to
which police exercise discretion. Information has not been collected about
how problematical the different kinds of encounters are. 6 Specifying the
scope for decision is not a necessary part of a description of situations. It is a
conclusion requiring information about what officers could do. Nor can inferences about the scope for choice be drawn from typical outcomes that situations generate. "Service" situations, occasions in which law enforcement
action is unlikely or inappropriate, are not necessarily less complex than
"enforcement" situations.7 The designation "order-maintenance" covers situations in which enforcement is appropriate but not automatically utilized.
Although the decision is implied by definition, the choice may not be particularly difficult.
Unless studies are undertaken of the problematical nature of particular situations, even data from very detailed studies of the composition of police
work will not reveal how much police work actually involves decision. However, information is available about the relative frequency of domestic disputes, which have been identified by patrolmen as being especially
problematic. Eric Scott, for example, reported a breakdown of 26,000 calls
for service in twenty-four metropolitan police forces in 1977 according to seventy-two categories. 8 He found that domestic conflict accounted for 2.7% of
calls for service. Moving violations accounted for 1%, but this statistic is not
informative because the study was of citizen calls for service, not of all
observed policy mobilizations. 9 In another study, "domestic trouble" also
accounted for 2.7% of all calls for service.' 0
These fragments of information suggest that the situations police consider
most problematic are not encountered often. If these are the best examples
police have of heavily discretionary situations, then making choices may not
be the quintessence of patrol work, apart from the need to decide whether to
act at all. Police officers may be exaggerating the proportion of problematic
6.

M.

FARMER

& M.

FURSTENBERG, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO POLICE CALLS

FOR SERVICE 2 (1979).

7. M. BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY (1964); W. LAFAVE, supra note 1; P. SHANE,
POLICE AND PEOPLE (1980); J. WILSON, supra note 1; LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law,
1962 WIs. L. REV. 104.
8. E. Scott, Calls for Service: Citizen Demand and Initial Response, 28-30 (1980) (Bloomington, Indiana: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, University of Indiana) (unpublished paper).
9. J. McIver & R. Parks, Identification of Effective and Ineffective Police Actions 13 (March
1982) (paper for the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences). Five percent of
all calls for police service involved domestic and nondomestic conflict.
10. Lilly, What Are the Police Now Doing?, 6 J. POLICE SCI. & AD. 51, 56 (1978).
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work, in part perhaps to enhance their own self-esteem and in part because
such situations are especially disconcerting to officers. What is needed before
firm conclusions can be drawn about how important experience might be in
policing is a systematic mapping of the range of responses actually employed
by patrol officers in the situations that occur most frequently.
Interestingly, the situations officers believe provide the greatest scope for
decision are among the most dangerous police face. Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics show that, between 1975 and 1979, disturbances (including
family fights, quarrels, and "man-with-a-gun") accounted for the largest proportion of police officers killed (17%). Robberies in progress, which are not
particularly problematic, were next (16%), and traffic stops and pursuit were
third (12 %). 11 Although dangerousness and "problematicalness" are conceptually distinct, they appear to be associated to some extent. Because officers
know these figures, it may be that their evaluations of the problematical
nature of situations reflect their fears.
III
WHAT EXPERIENCE TEACHES PATROL OFFICERS

Recognizing that focusing on domestic disputes and proactive traffic stops
may overemphasize the problematic character of police work, we find that
experience on the job contributes to learning about (1) goals, (2) tactics, and
(3) presence. That is, when officers talk about what is informative in practical
experience, these are the matters most frequently mentioned.
A.

Goals

Decisions about goals are antecedent to choices about tactics, which is not
to imply that officers are always purposive. Some officers are essentially aimless, in that they do not try to align tactics and objectives. Any attempt to do
so occurs after the fact, involving the false attribution of a rational purpose.
Nonetheless, in explaining what they seek to achieve, whether truly or spuriously, patrol officers describe their operating goals as (a) meeting departmental norms, (b) containing violence and controlling disorder,
(c) preventing crime, (d) avoiding physical injury to themselves, and
(e) avoiding provoking the public into angry retaliation that threatens their
careers. No priority can be given to these items; they are simply objectives
that patrol officers try to achieve in varying combinations from situation to
situation as they work. Each will now be explored in turn.
Departmental norms about what actions are to be undertaken are conveyed in many ways. Officers complain most about the "numbers game,"
numerical quotas that must be met by each officer. For example, commanders
sometimes unfavorably compare the number of felony arrests made by one
shift with those made by another, or the number of traffic tickets issued, or the
11.
(1981).

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 326, table 3.81
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amount of time spent "out of service" as opposed to patrolling. If the quotas
are not met, officers are told to "earn their pay." Generally announced
policies also constrain tactics, for example, with respect to using firearms
against fleeing felons, arresting for minor offenses, or arresting without
signed complaints in domestic disputes. The problem is that departmental
policy is often not clearly expressed or understood. Supervisors indicatesometimes subtly, sometimes directly-what they prefer by way of action.
Officers are aware that what they normally do is not what "the sergeant" or
"the lieutenant" would do. Officers cynically remark that calling a supervisor
for assistance in a domestic fight usually produces "two domestics," one
among civilians, another among police. Finally, tactical decisions are
powerfully shaped by departmental procedures for reporting action. Many
contacts with the public require filling out forms that are filed with the department. Often these forms present blocks to check, enumerating the actions
taken. These forms structure choice, because officers know that if they take an
action not specified, they will be required to provide an explanation. Explicit
and detailed forms not only simplify reporting, they raise the cost of exercising initiative. They may also encourage specious reporting.
All of these cues as to what departments consider to be acceptable action
are noticed by patrol officers, even when they are not followed. The expectations of departments are so constraining that officers, like youths walking
through a graveyard at night, frequently strike brave postures privately about
what is required. An officer may say proudly that, "When I'm on patrol I
forget about all the higher-ups, I'm my own little police force." He may be,
but the department has made him anxious nonetheless.
One of the great imperatives of a patrolman's life is the need to
"reproduce order," in Richard Ericson's apt phrase.' 2 It has been observed
that police characteristically are called to deal with "something-that-oughtnot-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-somethingnow."' 3 An essential part of police work is taking charge. The means used to
accomplish this end depend on the circumstances. They can involve hitting,
shooting, referring, rescuing, tending, separating, handcuffing, humoring,
threatening, placating, and discussing. The objective is to minimize the disruptions of normal life. As one officer said, "We keep the peace, we don't
settle problems." Police recognize the superficiality of what they do, often
blaming this on the pressure of work. The fact is that the police frequently
seem to have too much time on their hands and they are forever apologizing
for how slow a particular tour of duty is. Actually, officers may be right: they
are too busy to give the kind of attention that would make any permanent
difference to the circumstances encountered. The requirements for dealing
with deeper levels of problems are too exorbitant for police to meet. Doing

4 (1982).

12.

R.

13.

Bittner, Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police, in THE POTENTIAL

ERICSON, REPRODUCING ORDER:

A STUDY OF POLICE PATROL WORK

FOR REFORM IN THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 30

(1974).
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whatever is necessary to restore order is all that can reasonably be expected of
the police.
Not only do police want to restore order, they want to lower the likelihood
that future disorder, particularly crime, will occur. Though they tend to deny
it, police officers are future oriented. The test of success in domestic fights,
for example, is "no call-backs." Even while they deprecate the effect that their
actions can have on the root causes of problems, they accept uncritically that
they should work to deter future criminality. They do not view law enforce4
ment as an end in itself but as a tool for convincing people not to do wrong. 1
Faced with the threat of disorder, officers use laws to get leverage over
people, to threaten that if police orders are not followed, the people will go to
jail. 15 This is one reason police condemn the decriminalization of nonconforming behavior in public places, such as drinking alcoholic beverages, being
drunk, and loitering, that has taken place over the last generation. Such laws
are needed, the police argue, to help them gain control before more serious
incidents occur. But the police employ even longer time perspectives. This
perspective shows up when they explain why they do not enforce the law in
certain situations. Time and again they argue that an arrest or a citation
would do more harm than good. Why give a traffic ticket, for instance, to an
elderly woman who has run a red light and whose hands are shaking with fear
as the officer comes up to the car window? A ticket is gratuitous in such circumstances. Why encourage a woman to sign a complaint against the
drunken husband who has just blackened her eye when she admits she does
not want a divorce, it is apparent the family cannot make bail, and even a short
detention in jail may jeopardize the family's income? Whether the public
approves or not, patrol officers continually make judicial types of decisions,
deciding whether the imposition of the law will achieve what the spirit of the
law seems to call for. Police officers are convinced that they know more about
the deterrent utility of law than does anyone else. This attitude probably
explains why they become so angry at prosecutors and courts that are more
lenient than the police expected. They view prosecutors and courts as
second-guessing the evaluations made by officers who are more immediately
6
in touch with the practical reality of the situation.'
Patrol officers are continually alert to the danger of physical injury to
themselves. They take great care with protective equipment such as guns,
nightsticks, and sturdy multi-celled flashlights. Many officers now routinely
wear light-weight protective vests under their uniform shirts. Sometimes
vests are provided by police departments, but they are often purchased out of
the officer's own pocket. Police conversation is thick with stratagems for
avoiding injury, an urgency stressed from their earliest days in training: when
14.

A. REISS, supra note 1, at 134-38.

LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 138; C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL
136 (1978).
16. Reiss argues that anger against the courts also arises from the fact that police arrest only
when they feel it is morally justified. When courts are lenient, the policeman's sense of justice is
affronted. A. REIss, supra note 1, at 134-38.

15.

Bittner, supra note 13, at 22-29; W.

VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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knocking at residences where violence is suspected, do not stand in front of
doors; when making traffic stops at night, blind the eyes of the driver with
cruiser spotlights or a flashlight; when approaching a vehicle, one officer
should linger slightly behind the vehicle on the right side, hand on weapon,
while the other interrogates the driver; when questioning a driver, do not
stand in front of the door so that its sudden opening could harm you; carry a
small blackjack in the rear pocket in order to provide protection less provocatively than with a nightstick; unbutton holsters when responding to calls in
particular areas; always keep your head covered in certain tenement neighborhoods; and never turn your back on particular types of people. Police work,
according to officers, is fraught with unpredictable and frequently deadly violence. Getting home safely is a primary concern.
Police concern with deadly force is to some extent exaggerated. The death
rate for police is well below that of several other occupations. In 1980, for
example, the death rate per 100,000 police officers was 32.4, while it was 61
per 100,000 workers in agriculture, 50 per 100,000 workers in mining and
quarrying, and 43 per 100,000 construction workers.' 7 Police deaths, however, unlike those in other occupations, are not acts of God; they are generally
the result of willful, deliberate attacks. They are personal, human-to-human,
and imbued with malice in the same way that crime is generally. Just as the
public finds small comfort in statistics showing that they are safer on the
streets than in their bathtubs, police are more anxious in their work than construction workers are in theirs.
There is another aspect to policing, however, that accounts for officers'
pervasive concern with personal injury. Police continually deal with situations
in which physical constraint may have to be applied against people who are
willing to fight, struggle, hit, stab, spit, bite, tear, hurl, hide, and run. People
continually use their bodies against the police, forcing the police to deal with
them in a physical way. While police seem to be preoccupied with deadly
force, the more common reality in their lives is the possibility of a broken
nose, lost teeth, black eyes, broken ribs, and twisted arms. Few officers are
ever shot or even shot at, but all except the rawest rookie can show scars on
their bodies from continual encounters with low-level violence.
As a result, officers develop an instinctive wariness, what one officer called
"well-planned lay-back." While they never want to give the impression of
being afraid, especially to their peers, they try to avoid having to struggle with
people. Since they are obliged at the same time to establish control, they feel
justified in acting with preemptive force. In effect, they learn to act with a
margin of force just beyond what their would-be opponents might use. One
officer likened it to taking a five-foot jump over a four-foot ditch. Never cut
things too closely; if personal injury is likely, strike first with just enough force
to nullify the threat. When guns are believed to be present, this margin can
be deadly. Sometimes police concern with avoiding injury comes across as a
17. BUREAU OF THE
179, 403, 415 (1981).

CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.
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peculiar fastidiousness, not simply anxiety, but distaste for having to soil
themselves. Officers complain continually about having gotten blood on their
shirts, rips in their down jackets, dirt on their trousers, and vomit in their cars.
Many officers carry soft leather gloves for manhandling dirty people. In many
residences officers will not sit down for fear of bugs. Police officers often act
like people who have gotten dressed up to go to a party only to be confronted
with having to wipe up spilled food or change a tire. The point is that police
life is rough-and-tumble. Through preemption, overreaction, and simple
avoidance, officers try to minimize the unpleasant, sometimes deadly, physical
contact that is part of their job.
According to patrol officers, experience sharpens the ability to read potential violence in an encounter. The experienced officer avoids the use of
unnecessary physical force, as the "hot dog" does not, but at the same time he
is fully prepared to meet such force when necessary, especially by preempting
it. The experienced officer has learned when to relax and when to attack.
Competence involves the ability to do both and get away with it.
Finally, police worry a lot about repercussions from the actions they take
that may affect their careers. They have in mind, in particular, complaints and
civil suits. Police, unlike workers in most other jobs, are constantly being
reminded of the fatefulness of their actions to themselves as well as to the
public. They believe their jobs are on the line daily. So for police to avoid
what would be viewed as a mistake by the department or the courts is an
imperative.18 One aspect of what police learn on the job, then, is what not to
do. As an officer remarked, "In policing, don'ts are often more important
than do's." 1 9
In sum, experience has a great deal to teach police about goals. Essentially, it teaches an instinct for priorities. What kind of goals can reasonably
be achieved at the least cost to the officer? In Peter Manning's words:
The central problem of [policing], from the agent's perspective, is not moral but distinctly practical. The aim is to define the work in ways that will allow the occupational
members involved to manage it, to make reasonable decisions, control it, parcel it out
into meaningful, solvable, and understandable units
and episodes, and make this
20
accomplishment somewhat satisfying day after day.

This task involves juggling disparate goals that operate in varying time
frames. By and large, police goals are short-range in that their achievement
can be determined almost immediately. This observation is true with respect
to departmental expectations, the establishment of control, the avoidance of
injury, and the protection of the officer's career. The only exception is the
objective of preventing future crime and disorder. It seems reasonable to
suppose that short-run imperatives prevail in most cases because the
18. F. lanni & E. Reuss-lanni, Street Cops vs. Management Cops: The Two Cultures of Policing
24-28 (December 1980) (paper prepared for the seminar on policing at Nijenrode, The Netherlands).
19. This remark fits the dominant management strategy of police departments, which James Q
Wilson characterizes as constraint-oriented rather than task-oriented. J. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS
197-98 (1978).
20. P. MANNING, THE NARCS' GAME 17 (1980).
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information needed to judge whether preventive actions have worked are
beyond the ken of the serving police officer. Learning to subordinate longrange to short-range goals makes police officers appear uncaring and hardbitten. Their own awareness that they are dominated by short-run concerns
tends to make them cynical. But this deprecation of their own efforts is not
unique to police officers: it is an attitude developed by people in many occupations who learn to substitute practical, instrumental goals for larger visions
of social effectiveness. It is found among teachers, doctors, lawyers, social
workers, and businessmen. To some extent, then, what experience teaches
the police is an acceptance of social impotency.
If experience teaches policemen how to juggle complex priorities in
action, one can understand why civilian review is so threatening to them.
Police officers say civilian review is unfair because outsiders do not have the
experience to judge which actions are required in real-life situations. This
view is plausible, but it ignores the fact that choices among tactics are only
one part of the problem.

Indeed, impressionistic evidence suggests that

civilian review boards are frequently willing to accept police expertise. A
greater danger, from the police point of view, is that civilian reviewers will
insist on a different ordering of objectives, especially ones that ignore altogether the policeman and his career. This concern explains, perhaps, why
hostility to civilian review seems to go with the job. It follows naturally from
learning that goals have to be set in chaotic moments of action.
B.

Tactics

Tactical choices are the second area in which the police claim that experience is essential to learning. It is no longer informative to point out that
patrol officers do much more than enforce the law. This fact has been thoroughly established by research. But the range of options employed by patrol
officers is much greater than this observation conveys. Patrol officers can discern as well as discuss an array of tactical alternatives. Moreover, they can
distinguish actions that are appropriate at different stages of an intervention.
What patrol officers do has commonly been described according to their culminating actions-arrest, referral, friendly advice, threats, and so forth. 21 But
officers have done many things already before they decide how they will leave
an encounter. Adequate description of police tactics requires paying attention to different stages in the evolution of police-public interactions.2 2 An
exploration of the tactics police use must distinguish at least three different
stages: contact, processing, and exit. Each stage offers distinctly different
choices to patrol officers. These choices will be explored in the cases of
domestic disputes and proactive traffic stops, recognizing that these may be
the most problematic situations for police officers.
21.

Black uses categories of this kind: penal, compensatory, therapeutic, and conciliatory. D.

BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAw 6 (1976); BLACK supra note 1, ch. 5.
22. R. SYKES & E. BRENT, POLICING: A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST PERSPECTIVE (1984). This sophisticated work tried to determine how antecedent stages shaped later ones.
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At contact in domestic disputes, police may choose from at least nine
different courses of action. As one would expect, these serve by and large to
establish immediate control over events, to shift the axis of interaction from
the disputants to the officers. The possible courses of action are: to listen
passively to disputant(s), verbally restrain disputant(s), threaten physical
restraint, apply physical restraint, request separation of disputants, impose
separation on disputants, physically force separation, divert attention of disputants, or question to elicit the nature of the problem.
As officers settle into an encounter, having established control on their
own terms, they may choose from among eleven tactics: let each disputant
have his say in turn, listen in a nondirective way, actively seek to uncover the
nature of the problem, accept the situation as defined by the complainant,
reject the view of the complainant, follow the request made by the complainant, physically restrain someone, urge someone to sign a complaint, talk
someone out of signing a complaint, investigate the incident further without
indicating likely action, and indicate that there is nothing the police can do.
Finally, police need to terminate the encounter and make themselves available for other business. Their exiting actions may again be substantially different from anything done before; they may: fail to find the other disputant,
find the other disputant and warn or advise, arrest someone, separate disputants temporarily by observing one off the premises, by transporting one from
the scene or by arranging a pickup by someone else, explicitly warn disputants
about the consequences of future trouble, give friendly advice about how to
avoid a repetition, provide pointed advice to disputant(s) about how to
resolve the issue, suggest referral to third parties, promise future police assistance, transport injured persons to a medical facility, issue a notice of police
23
contact, or simply leave.
Even if these lists of tactics are not exhaustive, the number of alternatives
open to officers is already formidable-nine at contact, eleven at processing,
and eleven at exit. Experienced patrol officers have strong opinions about
which of these courses of action to pursue under different circumstances.
Moreover, they criticize one another for choosing the wrong one. For
example, police academies often teach that officers should separate disputants
immediately and never let them continue to argue. Officers say, however, that
the ventilation of grievances is sometimes all that both parties want. The best
defusing tactic, therefore, is to let them get things off their chests, with police
playing the role of friendly referee. For wives, particularly, calling the police
is an act of assertion in itself and they are satisfied when they have made their
point. Rather than arresting the husband, the police are better advised to
provide her with a safe opportunity to make a statement. When neighbors
dispute, arrival of the police may actually exacerbate the argument as both
23. Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 914-60; M. Haist & R.
Daniel, Draft of a Report on Structure and Process of Disturbance Transactions (January, 1975)
(unpublished draft at the Police Foundation), and J. McIver & R. Parks, supra note 9, are the only
attempts to map tactics in domestic disputes known to the authors.
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parties feel they need not worry about things getting out of hand. So some
officers covertly restrain the growing altercation by turning their backs or
pulling away, indicating that they really do not care what happens. Frequently
this action causes the dispute to lose some of its steam.
Officers are especially sensitive to actions they take that may make situations more explosive. They are particularly careful, for example, to avoid
laying hands on people unless they absolutely must. Touching connotes
restraint and it is apt to be resented. Officers say that people of a minority
group are especially quick to anger when police touch them. So police learn
to move people about verbally or by imposing their bodies without actually
reaching out. This tactic is related to the need to save "face," something most
officers recognize as being important. Police must be careful not to inflict
humiliation gratuitously. For this reason, patrol officers think twice before
writing out traffic tickets to fathers in front of their children, unless the violation is serious or the man uncivil. 24 Officers believe that older people get
angry at traffic stops because they are accustomed to disciplining rather than
being disciplined. They feel belittled. Thus, officers tread warily so as not to
make acquiescence difficult. Similarly, many officers testify to thanks earned
by not handcuffing men in front of their children but doing so outside the
residence or in the patrol car. It also seems that men submit to handcuffs
more tractably than do women, who frequently become hysterical and sometimes violent.
Demonstrating the importance of obtaining control without physical injury
in the hierarchy of operating values, patrol officers have a great fund of stories
about how violent situations were defused through cunning verbal ploys. For
example, an officer who was a born-again Christian spotted religious decor in
the home of a couple who had had a violent argument. He asked them what
they thought the Lord would want them to do and ten minutes later they were
reconciled. One tactic is to divert the attention of disputants, thus allowing
emotions to cool. Noting what appears to be handmade furniture, an officer
may say, "Do you make furniture? So do I." Others ask if they may use the
bathroom, obliging the residents to point it out, or inquire what the score is of
the baseball game on TV, or request a cup of coffee or a soft drink. One
officer gained control in a domestic dispute by sitting down indifferently in
front of the television set and calmly taking off his hat. The husband and wife
were so nonplussed at this lack of concern for their fight that shortly they, too,
lost interest. Stories like these are so common among officers that they
should probably be taken with a grain of salt. The same stories crop up too
often, suggesting that they have become part of the mythology of policing,
passed on uncritically from officer to officer. Told always with pride, they are
used to illustrate the subtlety of police officers. Most of the ploys so lovingly
described are also clearly not in general use, 25 as most officers admit that
24. See also D. BLACK, supra note 1, at 34.
25. M. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET ch. 9 (1981), found significant differences in the tactics
officers said they would use in four scenarios presented to them. The scenarios involved drunken
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while they try to defuse violence without using physical restraint, their own
stratagems are more direct.
Officers also tend to agree on what actions are to be avoided, such as
failing to gain control quickly enough when injury is likely, making threats
that cause people to lose face, taking sides in an argument, leaving a dispute
with a threat about what the police will do when they return, and making takeit-or-leave-it statements that the police cannot honor. These are the mistakes
rookies make. Only experienced officers are presumed to have the diagnostic
skills to know when these tactics can be used safely.
It is precisely with respect to the choice of tactics that the separation
between the craft of policing and the science of policing is most destructive.
Officers say experience teaches them what works. But does it? They manage
to get along, which means avoiding affronting the department or getting seriously hurt or sued, but are they intelligently discriminating in their tactical
choices so that they are raising the probability of achieving stated goals? Perhaps almost anything "works" most of the time, largely because the police are
so authoritative in relation to the people with whom they have to deal. The
questions that need to be answered scientifically are: (1) can the tactics and
the circumstances of encounters be better matched so that patrol officers can
more certainly avoid failures according to their own criteria; (2) are the longrun, post-encounter effects that officers want to accomplish truly achieved
through the actions they choose; and (3) do the tactics they choose produce
unintended consequences that deserve to be considered? At the moment, this
kind of factual knowledge is not being provided to officers. The fault is not
that of the serving police officer. By necessity, he must fall back on the lore
that experience generates. The problem is that science has not illuminated
the operational imperatives of the work that patrol officers do. Nor have
police departments acknowledged that guidance could be useful. Crouched
behind the statement that "every situation is different," they have failed to pay
attention to what their own rank and file are telling them: namely, that
learning about what "works" is possible and that it is taking place already
through the haphazard mechanism of individual experience. While the partisans of science have failed to focus on the tactical world of the serving
officer, police officers have not seen that it is contradictory to say that
although every situation is different, experience is crucial.
Turning to traffic stops, we have identified ten actions considered appropriate at contact, seven at processing, and eleven at exit. At contact, officers
may leave the driver in the car, order him out, leave passengers in the car,
order passengers out, ask the driver for documents, ask passengers for documents, order the driver to remain in the car, order passengers to remain in the
car, point out the violation that prompted the stop, and ask the driver if he
knew why the stop was made. At processing, officers may check whether the
car and the driver are "clear," give a roadside sobriety test, make a body
driving, quarreling neighbors, assault between husband and wife, and disorderly juveniles in a public
place.
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search of the driver, make a body search of the passengers, search the vehicle
from outside, search the vehicle from inside, and discuss the alleged traffic
violation. At exit, officers may release the car and the driver, release with a
warning, release with a traffic citation, release with both a citation and an
admonishment, arrest the driver for a prior offense, arrest for being drunk,
arrest for crimes associated with evidence found during the stop, arrest for
actions during the encounter, impound the car, insist that the driver proceed
on foot, help the driver to arrange for other transportation, arrest the passengers for the same reasons as the driver, transport the driver someplace
without making an arrest, and admonish the passengers.
Officers have different opinions about what tactics to apply at each stage,
recognizing, of course, that some situations permit little latitude. On initial
contact, for example, officers favor different gambits. Some tell the driver
why he was stopped before asking for his license and registration. This settles
the driver's natural curiosity and puts him on the defensive. Others first ask
for documents, thus ensuring that the driver will not escape and demonstrating that information will be given only when the officer chooses. Still
others like to begin with the question "Do you know why I stopped you?",
hoping that the drivers, most of whom drive on the edge of the law, will admit
an infraction even more serious than the one that led to the stop. The officer
can then be magnanimous, agreeing to forgive the more serious offense in
favor of the lesser that the officer was going to ticket anyhow. Not all these
gambits can, of course, be tried in every situation; they depend on particular
circumstances. But it is easy to see that each gives a distinctive impetus to the
police-citizen interaction. At least police believe so, making choice of action
on their part a test of professional savvy.
The crucial stage, from the public's point of view, is exit, where there are
eleven different possibilities that are used singly or in combination. Most
officers disagree strongly with the teaching that they should make up their
minds whether or not to issue a ticket before approaching a stopped vehicle.
Although some officers will ticket anyone-even their grandmothers, as other
officers contemptuously say-most believe that individuation is essential to
justice. It is unnecessary, for example, to give tickets for driving without a
license to responsible people who admit their offense but can't produce their
licenses. Officers, too, have left their wallets at home while-running to do an
errand or have forgotten to take their licenses out of their checkbooks after
going to the bank. Drivers have been "cleared" on the basis of all sorts of
identification, including credit cards and fishing licenses.
The key ingredient in exit decisions, apart from the seriousness of the
offense, is the attitude of the driver. If the violation is minor, drivers who
admit error and do not challenge the authority of the officer are likely to be
treated leniently, unless departmental policy decrees otherwise. On the other
hand, drivers who dispute the offense, question the value of what the officer is
doing, use disrespectful language, and threaten to complain will virtually
write themselves a citation. Officers are especially resentful of well-to-do
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people driving expensive late-model cars who threaten to complain to "the
chief' or "the mayor." Officers are proud of their one-line put-downs of such
people, such as, "Do you know the chief too? When you see him tell him
Officer Jones gave you a ticket today." While much of this bravado is probably indulged only off the street, it accurately reflects what officers may consider in making exit choices. At the same time, officers often take amazing
amounts of verbal abuse from people for whom profanity is as natural as
breathing. The same is true for racial put-downs by blacks of white officers,
such as studied, face-saving condescension and mutterings about "honky
cops." Officers also know the importance that their own demeanor has in
shaping the results of a stop. If they do decide to give a ticket, they try to be
matter-of-fact, unless provoked, and to avoid verbal humiliation. The choice
is between ticketing or lecturing and releasing. In the words of one officer,
"chew or cite, but not both."
It would appear that the tactical choices patrol officers make, at least for
domestic disputes and traffic stops, are much more extensive than is generally
recognized. They have to learn what "works" in terms of objectives that they
can reasonably judge in circumstances that vary enormously. They are
anxious about the fatefulness of their actions for themselves as well as for
others, fearful that the instant diagnoses they make will be incorrect. This is
undoubtedly what prompts the often repeated assertion that every situation is
different, which, according to the officers' own testimony about the utility of
experience, is not true. Donald Black has shown that tactical choices with
respect to exiting actions in domestic disputes are affected by a small number
of structural features in each encounter-race, class, age, status of complainant in the household, intimacy between the people involved, institutional
affiliation of complainants, and attacks on police legitimacy. 26 However, the
effect of these factors does not appear large, accounting for between ten and
twenty-five percent of the variance. 27 As has been noted, officers want to
emphasize the difficulty of their work. Confronted by social scientists probing
to uncover choices, they may even exaggerate small differences in procedural
detail, falsely attributing forethought to automatic decisions. None of this,
however, contradicts the fact that choices are made, sometimes among a bewildering number of alternatives, and that officers cannot readily state the principles that they use to simplify the situational complexities faced. The best they
can do is to tell anecdotes. That they do simplify, as Black points out, in no
way diminishes the uncertainty they feel in making tactical choices. Having
implicit operating principles does not lessen anxiety. Nor does it follow that
experience is not important in learning to apply them. Moreover, officers are
often genuinely trying to forecast the effects of their actions on a recurrence
26. D. BLACK, supra note 1, at 75-80. Black's analysis applies to his four categories of action,
which are termed exit actions in this article. He does not try to explain the structural determinants of
the tactics police use at earlier stages of disputes.
27. R. Friedrich, The Impact of Organizational, Individual, and Situational Factors on Police
Behavior (1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, available at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
Dept. of Political Science).
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of the situation. Unfortunately, they have only rough-and-ready rules for
doing so, probably involving the factors Black has noted. Here is where the
lore of policing with respect to tactics is probably the least well-informed and
the chances for bias to intrude the greatest.
What officers need, of course, is information that shows what the likely
results will be from the use of tactics of different sorts in various situations.
As Herman Golstein has said:
[S]ystematic analysis and planning have rarely been applied to specific behavior and
social problems that constitute the agency's routine business. The situation is somewhat analogous to a private industry that studies the speed of its assembly line, the
productivity of its employees, and the nature of its public28relations program, but does
not examine the quality of the product being produced.

Such testing will not be easy to carry out, although the principles for doing so
are clear. 2 9 This is scant comfort to patrolmen. In the absence of tested
knowledge about what works, patrol officers have no resource to call on
except their own collective experience. From their perspective, choice is an
operational necessity, and they see trial and error as the only way to learn
about it.30
C.

Presence

The third important feature that experience teaches is "presence." Effective policing is more than simply doing things, it involves being something.
The key elements of effective presence are external calm and internal alertness. Police say repeatedly that it is essential to be nonprovocative in contacts
with the public-to adopt a demeanor that pacifies, placates, and mollifies.
"Always act," said an experienced officer, "as if you were on vacation." In
effect, be careful not to heighten the tension already present. At the same
time, officers must never relax. They must be constantly watchful and alert
because danger can arise in an instant. Danger, however, is not the only
threat. All officers with any seniority speak bitterly of the times they were
"conned," accepting uncritically a story told to them on which they then
acted. Police learn quickly that appearance and reality are often sharply different. People will use the police for their own purposes if they can, even if it
means telling elaborate lies. Some people, police know, really are evil. As a
result, police officers often appear indifferent, cynical, and unsympathetic in
the most heart-rending situations. The presence that police officers cultivate
is much like that of professional athletes, who talk, too, about the importance
of balancing concentration and relaxation. One must be keyed up but not
"choke." In policing, this means that officers must protect without provoking.
28.

Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-OrientedApproach, 25 J. CRIME & DELINQ. 236, 243

(1979).

29. The authors will explore this problem and suggest specific research projects in a forthcoming paper.
30. On the absence of research on this topic, see M. Wycoff, Reconceptualizing the Police Role
(November 1980) (draft report from the Police Foundation for the National Institute ofJustice). The
Police Division of the National Institute of Justice has recognized the importance of this problem;
their grant supported the work that led to this article.
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The inward equanimity that leads to outward poise is not something people
are born with, nor can it be taught. As in sports, it is learned through
practice.
In summary, then, from the point of view of the patrol officer, policing is
more like a craft than a science, in that officers believe that they have important lessons to learn that are not reducible to principle and are not being
taught through formal education. These lessons concern goals-which ones
are reasonable; tactics-which ones ensure achievement of different goals in
varying circumstances; and presence-how to cultivate a career-sustaining
personality. "Experience-tested good sense," as one officer said, is what
police must learn over the years.
What has not been grasped, however, is that even if policing at the present
time is more craft than science, learning can take place, skills can be increased,
and levels of expertise can be discerned. Officers themselves recognize this
point when they talk about how they "learned" to become effective. They also
continually complain that standards of performance should distinguish
degrees of coping ability, not mechanical conformity to specific do's and
don'ts-excluding horrendous errors, of course.
Although seldom admitted, learning in policing involves discovering how
each officer can achieve stated goals within his own personal limitations. If
tactics are as varied as has been shown, then different styles may be equally
effective. Some officers have a gift of gab, others do not. Some officers are so
physically imposing they can reduce violence simply by "blotting out the
sun;" others have to raise their voices, threaten retaliation, or spin a yarn.
Being skilled in policing, as in carpentry, is a matter of learning to be effective
with the materials and tools at hand.
The police community is very judgmental about skills displayed on the job,
quite apart from formal systems of performance appraisal. Policemen judge
the work of colleagues all the time. To begin with, patrol work is often performed before an audience of other officers. In domestic disputes, for
example, several cars frequently respond when violence has been reported.
As the premises suddenly fill up with large men in blue uniforms, the first
officer on the scene has to give a lead as to how the situation will be handled.
Whether comfortable or not, he dare not back away. He has to perform onview. Rookies particularly feel the presence of this attentive audience.
Remembering his own days as a rookie, one officer said, "It's like your ears
are on stalks." Rookies cannot help notice when an experienced officer gives
a snort of laughter or contemptuously turns his back.
And well they should be concerned, because police officers make judgments about the strengths and weaknesses of colleagues all the time which
they do not hesitate to express. Reputations are made in a twinkling, especially for recruits or newly transferred personnel. Every unit has its known
hotheads, deadbeats, unreliables, and head-knockers. They also have
respected master craftsmen, although this designation is not used. These
officers are cool, poised, inventive, careful, active, and nonviolent-officers
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who can cope without jeopardizing themselves or others. Appraisals of colleagues are a staple of police conversation, often taking place between partners in patrol cars and prompted only by hearing an officer speak over the
radio: "Go get 'em, hot dog"; "Surprised he's not taking his fifth coffee
break"; "Uh, oh, we'll have to cover that screw-up for sure"; and "Smith has
got a rookie tonight." Judgments are also conveyed through preferences
officers express for partners. Some are shunned, others are sought out.
Occasionally, doubts about performance will be so serious that officers will
indicate privately to supervisors that they will not work with a particular
officer. Only the most insensitive policeman could fail to appreciate that if
people are talking about others as openly as they do, they must be talking
about him too. Officers know that reputations are on the line whenever they
work. Among their own kind, they want to be known as master craftsmen,
hoping to escape from the stigma of apprentice as soon as possible.
In policing, then, it is legitimate to talk about skills and to make judgments
about performance. The critical question is whether there is a consensus
about craftsmanship. That is, although officers recognize differences in performance, do they agree on what constitutes better as opposed to worse
activity? Police officers could be in the tragic situation of wanting desperately
to learn from experience yet receiving conflicting signals from their peers.
Approval of skill may be given for nothing more profound than doing things
-my way." In these circumstances, learning would consist of developing a
mode of operation that bore little relation either to objective measures of
effectiveness or approval by peers. The situation may not, however, be so
dismal. Like teaching, good policing may be easier to recognize in practice
than to define abstractly. Perhaps officers really do agree on who is especially
skilled, raising the possibility that learning through emulation is possible.
The truth of this matter would be important to test. It would also be easy to
do. Officers would be asked to identify by name others whom they consider to
be particularly skilled. If there was reasonable agreement, observers would
then determine whether these individuals acted in terms of similar goals,
chose similar tactics, and displayed the same presence. Observation would be
better than asking officers about the qualities that caused them to identify
others as being skilled, because officers might simply project onto others what
they thought should be valued in themselves. Since patrol officers believe,
almost as an article of faith, that supervisors evaluate performance superficially, ignoring displays of skill that do not show up in numbers, it would be
important to solicit opinions about skilled officers from all ranks. Supervisors
may not be quite as out of touch as they are portrayed to be. Alternatively,
they may be emphasizing norms that increase the uncertainty patrol officers
feel as they go about their daily work.
The final and indispensable step would be to determine whether the tactics
chosen by master craftsmen really worked as intended. As in medicine, a
proper bedside manner does not guarantee correct diagnosis or treatment.
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Only rigorous testing of the efficacy of tactical choices can at last transform
police lore into the wisdom its practitioners think it to be.
IV
CAN THE CRAFT BE TAUGHT?

If learning to make correct choices takes place by and large in the crucible
of experience, rather than through formal training, then the development of
occupational skills is likely to be a lengthy process whose outcome is far from
certain. It does not follow, however, that learning could not be accelerated
and made more systematic. We would like to make four suggestions for
making the transition from apprentice to master craftsman both faster and
31
more assured.
First, formal training programs must give more attention to the problematic nature of police work. Oddly, police keep talking as if policing were a
craft, but recruits are instructed as if it were a science. As Manning remarked,
"The striking thing about order-maintenance methods is how little they are
taught, how cynically they are viewed, and how irrelevant they are thought to
be in most police departments." 3 2 The reason is probably that training staffs
do not know how to instruct in craftsmanship. As in colleges, teaching mainly
consists of lecturing and listening. What is needed in police training, instead,
is frank discussion, with case studies of the realities of field decision. Training
in police academies is too much like introductory courses on anatomy in medical schools and not enough like internships. The problem, however, is that
this kind of training would require admitting what command staffs would
rather hide, namely, that in many situations no one is really quite sure what is
the best thing to do.
Training must focus on the need for choice in specific, clearly delineated
situations. The reality of police work must be brought into the classroom so
that students and staff can discuss appropriate goals and tactics. They should
also be encouraged to think reflectively about the cues that should be used to
shape decisions and those that should not. These training objectives can be
accomplished in several ways. Students and staff can simulate "street"
encounters, taking the roles of citizens and police. Students can be asked to
discuss how they would respond to a variety of written scenarios. Discrepancies among students should be highlighted, with an analysis made of what the
likely results of responding in each way would be. Films and videotapes, now
being developed fairly widely, could be used to portray the hurly-burly of real
life. In all of these cases, master craftsmen, if they can be identified, should be
used to help train recruits. This does not mean that they should have classes
turned over to them, since they are generally not trained in instruction, nor
31. In putting forward these four recommendations, this article does not mean to imply that all
police departments in the United States are remiss in these respects. There are departments in which
these proposals have already been substantially incorporated. Nonetheless, many departments have

not done so and should give these ideas serious consideration.
32. P. MANNING, POLICE WORK 289 (1977).
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should they be brought in primarily to excite the recruits with "war stories." 33
Rather, they should be used as authentic exhibits to help instructors explore
the uncertainties of choice that police face on the street. It is their experience
that should be deliberately and systematically tapped. Finally, academic discussion must alternate with observation of patrol operations. This practice is
followed now in many departments. Unfortunately, debriefing is rarely systematic; field experiences are not used to prompt discussion about the range
of goals and the probable effectiveness of various tactics.
Second, master craftsmen should be used as field instructors for rookies.
This is the rationale behind programs in many departments in which probationary officers are assigned to experienced patrolmen for periods of time.
Though field instruction programs are a considerable advance over training
wholly in classroom settings, the full potential for uncovering significant craft
skills is not being developed. Too often, appointment as a field instructor is a
reward for having an unblemished record, not for recognition of superior
skills, or it is a reward for meeting departmental criteria of performance,
which are not necessarily those of craft operatives. The importance of discovering whether this gap in performance norms really exists has already been
explored. Furthermore, field instructors are rarely trained to draw lessons
from their own experience. They have no more insight into what they are
doing than do other officers. In particular, they may be totally blind to alternative ways of accomplishing the same objective. They may be especially confident, which makes their advice particularly persuasive, but they are not
necessarily more informed. Finally, because field instructors are often
responsible for evaluating the performance of trainees, they are viewed as
judges rather than as mentors. They intimidate the recruit rather than draw
out his perplexity about police work. Training and evaluation should be more
carefully separated, even though that may lengthen the probationary period.
Third, if policing does encompass varying levels of skill related to experience, it follows that learning can be continual and cumulative. The shape of
the learning curve would need to be determined through research. It may be
found that diminished returns set in relatively soon after an officer leaves the
academy, or that learning continues fairly steadily throughout most of an
officer's career. If learning tapered off rapidly, it would be necessary to find
out whether this was due to the unexpected simplicity of the work or to the
lack of encouragement for continued growth in skills. On the testimony of
police themselves, learning should not be viewed as a short-run matter. It
needs to be built into policing throughout an officer's career. This need is
generally recognized under the rubric of in-service training. Unfortunately,
in-service training relies primarily on sending people back to classrooms for
traditional lectures and note-taking. If skills are to be further developed, what
is needed are seminars among patrol personnel in which they share their
understanding of appropriate goals and useful tactics. Officers must be
33.

Van Maanen, Working the Street: A Developmental View of Police Behavior, in THE POTENTIAL FOR

REFORM IN CRIMINALJUSTICE 88-91 (H. Jacob ed. 1974).
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helped to learn from one another less haphazardly than they do in the front
seats of patrol cars. Such seminars should not be bull sessions, where people
talk in a nondirective way. Seminars must be carefully led by people who are
trained in maintaining focus, imposing discipline, and drawing out participants. In our own seminars with officers, we found that patrolmen frequently
disagree about elementary facts concerning law, departmental policy, and the
functioning of the criminal justice system. Opportunities for relevant instruction emerge out of the perplexity of officers themselves. Furthermore,
although officers recognize that there are different ways for handling situations, they have never had an opportunity to share insights about the relative
utility of these approaches. They do what comes naturally, which may be
good or may be bad. The final benefit from forthright discussion is that it may
resensitize jaded officers to the problems and potentialities of the job. Experience may teach, but it also rigidifies. Being comfortable in one's work is not
the same as being effective in it.
In-service seminars may contribute to raising performance levels even
though immediate skill development does not occur. Because they are a visible sign that departments take seriously the complexity of patrol work and
value the learning that experience engenders, in-service seminars may raise
the standing of patrol work. Officers are proud of what they have learned, not
always with reason, and interested in demonstrating their skill. As in the
famous Hawthorne study of industrial productivity, institutional attention to
their workday life may rekindle the enthusiasm of officers for their work.
Fourth, assuming that experience is valuable in learning about police
work, departments should reward advancement in skill development. Presently, police departments reward superior achievement by promoting people
into supervisory positions or transferring them to non-patrol duties. Thus,
they lose skills in patrol without assuredly gaining talent for other pursuits.
Good patrolmen are not necessarily good supervisors, any more than they are
good detectives, planners, or juvenile counselors. Police departments must
find ways to encourage continued growth in patrol skills among the people
who remain in patrol work.
Identifying and using master craftsmen in departmental training is an
important first step. It demonstrates to the rank and file that skills are recognized, that what is learned on the street is valued. But there are other possibilities that should be explored as well. Pay raises might be given to people
recognized by their peers as master craftsmen. Departments might also establish a special title, rank, or insignia for officers who are especially skilled in
patrol work. The point is to convince patrol officers that the creative use of
experience in learning to perform more effectively is appreciated.
V
THE BOTrOM LINE

Experience teaches lessons to patrol officers that they consider crucial to
effective performance and career longevity. Complicated decisions are being
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made on the street about goals and tactics in the face of enormously varied
social circumstances. This being the case, obvious benefits would result from
ensuring that what is being learned bears a close relation to approved goals,
that correct tactical lessons are being reinforced, and that learning takes place
as quickly as possible. In order to accomplish this, it is important to study the
coherence among what pass as craft skills in departments and the connection
between tactics and both short-range and long-range outcomes. Most important of all, police departments must face up to the implications for training of
their own argument that policing is learned by experience.
The benefits of doing all this are obvious. First, giving institutional attention to the skills that experience teaches will raise morale and self-esteem
among the most numerous police rank, the patrolmen, who bear the major
responsibility for police performance. Emphasizing the subtlety of patrol
work also redresses the overemphasis on criminal investigation, so often
deplored by policemen and observers alike. 34 Patrol work would begin to be
perceived as a disciplined activity, no less demanding than the work of
detectives.
Second, police departments would be forced to develop techniques for
measuring degrees of skill. It is a matter for fierce debate in police circles
whether existing measures do so. Most patrolmen think they do not, arguing
that evaluation is based on quantitative indicators which measure activity
rather than effectiveness. As we have suggested, a careful study of the performance traits of officers recognized by their peers as being especially good
at patrol work would help to clarify this matter. It does not follow, of course,
that patrolmen are right. If a discrepancy exists between what officers and the
organization think is good patrol work, it should be eliminated. If, on the
other hand, the discrepancy exists only in the minds of the rank and file, steps
should be taken to correct this impression.
Third, only by developing canons for better/worse, proper/improper,
more/less useful patrol action can policing become truly professional. Professionalism-meaning the development and imposition of operating principles
out of an on-going cooperative analysis-is essential in both scientific and
craft domains of work. Indeed, it is precisely when operating principles are
unclear that responsible learning requires the systematic and sensitive
pooling of experience. Paradoxically, policing has not developed the selfconsciousness that claims about the craft nature of policing would entail. For
all the talk, the police community has not acted as if it really believes that
there is utility in studying experience. Policemen have wanted the autonomy
of professionals without accepting the counterbalancing responsibility for
regulating the work of practitioners in operational terms. It is not being
argued that policemen are more duplicitous than other claimants to professional status, but police have not successfully convinced either themselves or

34.

P. MANNING, supra note 32, at 372.
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the public that their work is highly skilled. Until they do, their talk about
professionalism will seem presumptuous.
Here is the rub: Substantial risks are involved for the police in openly
admitting that goals are not fixed, that law enforcement is often uncertain,
and that tactical choices are matters of opinion. They become politically more
vulnerable if they say outright that patrol work requires the development of
skills over time, for it implies that the great mass of police officers are flying by
the seat of their pants. Police officers may chafe at the fact that their work is
undervalued because its subtlety is not understood, but the fiction of automatic decisionmaking protects them from being second-guessed.
Little imagination is required to foresee what would happen to public confidence in the police if they admitted that age, education, class, race, and sex
were considered when they decide what to do. These factors are considered,
however, and the police believe, on the basis of hard-won experience, that
they must be considered. Here are some examples. A white man and a black
man, each well-dressed, each carrying a television set from a retail store to the
trunk of a car at 5:30 p.m., will probably be treated differently by the police.
Officers will not only be more suspicious of the black man and more likely to
stop and question him, they will also be more circumspect in their approach if
they decide to confront him. They know that black men have had a belly full
of "hassling" and are much more likely than white men to get angry. Another
example deals with spouse assault reports made by Hispanic, as opposed to
black, women. Because Hispanic women have been found to be less willing
than black women to file complaints against husbands who beat them, police
officers have to work harder to provide equal protection. Their approach to
marital discord has to follow different lines from the beginning. Antagonism
toward the police is often more intense in some places in a community than in
others. Officers, therefore, take more precautions in those areas. From their
point of view, this behavior is reasonable; from the public's, it is hostile, provocative, and demeaning. On a warm Friday night, shortly after dark,
cruising patrol officers saw a small car pull away from the side door of a public
school. As the car went past them, they saw that the driver was a white
middle.aged man who hardly gave the police a passing glance. "Your basic
pillar?" said one officer. "Yep," replied the other, "your basic pillar." The
car was not stopped for investigation. Can such a decision be explained to the
public without controversy?
A real distinction does exist between useful operational intelligence and
prejudice, but because both utilize the same cues, they are difficult to separate
in practice. 35 It would certainly be unrealistic, as well as unreasonable, to
expect patrolmen not to make decisions about goals and tactics on the basis of
situational circumstances such as the visible appearance of the people
involved. Unless choice is precluded altogether in police work, officers
35. M. PUCH, POLICING THE INNER CITY 124 (1979), and C. Shearing, Cops Don't Always See It
That Way (1977) (unpublished paper), show how police distinguish good people from bad people on
the basis of ostensible features.
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cannot avoid developing stereotypes. To achieve the goals of control, crime
prevention, personal safety, and career protection, patrol officers must adapt
what they do to what they see. 3 6 In order to protect such decisions from prejudice, however, more examination of the link between visible cues and the
results of particular tactics must be made. In particular, research must be
undertaken to determine what really does work both tactically and strategically. Is it true, for example, that disproportionate attention to black teenager
activity on the streets produces more criminal arrests than arrests of teenagers
indiscriminately; that a criminal complaint pressed by the police with a wife's
approval is not as effective in providing protection for the battered spouse
who is Hispanic, even if the complaint is eventually withdrawn, as for the
spouse who is black and prosecutes to the end; or that preemptive force
against strapping black males controls violence and avoids injuries to police
more surely than less provocative tactics? Addressing such questions is essential if prejudice and operational intelligence are to be distinguished. However, the point remains that if different approaches are found efficacious
based on ascriptive stereotypes, as police officers certainly believe, imparting
these lessons will look very much to nonpolice observers like legitimating
discrimination.
In point of fact, the public may not disagree with police decisions as much
as the police fear it does. John Clark compared what the police and public
respectively thought were appropriate police actions in six hypothetical situations. 37 He found that the police tended to recommend arrest more and that
they thought the public wanted more arrests than they really did. This evidence would suggest that the public would welcome more individuation, but
that it is the police who are reluctant. In an international testing of what the
public would approve in four criminal situations, the public agreed that police
decisions should be affected both by the nature of the crime and the class of
the perpetrator.3 8 The public appeared to believe, as the police do, that
actions should be bent to considerations of natural justice.
Undoubtedly, there are serious potential costs to the police in responding
to the challenge of improving skills by forthrightly addressing how policing is
learned. This is not the last word, however, about the public's likely reaction.
Failure to confront the learning requirements of patrol work not only affects
police performance and morale, but also does not solve the problem of public
perception. Police are fooling themselves if they think so. If choice is unavoidable in police work, because goals and tactics must be determined situationally, pretending otherwise becomes a living lie that the public soon
detects. Although facing the training implications of patrol work will be controversial, not doing so is also controversial. The police lose the opportunity
36. Clark & Sykes, Some Determinantsof Police Organizationand Practice in a Modern IndustrialDemocracy, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 467 (D. Glazer ed. 1974).
37. Clark, Isolation of the Police: A Comparison of the British and American Situations, 56 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 327 (1965).
38.
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FOUR CITIES 63-64 (1973).
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for developing public acceptance of their professional status that would not
only be gratifying but that they believe would enhance effectiveness. Part of
the reason the public questions the use of discretion is that the police, have
always tried to appear exclusively as technical agents of law rather than instruments of public morality. A vicious circle has arisen. If police improved performance by testing the "lessons of experience" for efficacy, both through
controlled observation and the sharing of collective police experience, and
then imparted those lessons more systematically to police officers, the public
might have more confidence in the police as moral arbiters. Unfortunately, at
the present, the public's distrust of the police impels officers to hide the problematic nature of their work, causing departments to undervalue what the
rank and file believe is critical to their work, to neglect intelligent appraisal of
collective experience, and to pass up the opportunity to reward those who do
patrol work particularly well.

